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The study of radicalisation and its countermeasures is relatively new, thus, there are issues 
and controversies surrounding how best to prevent radicalisation, particularly the threat of 
violent radicalisation that might emerge from Higher Education Institutions’ (HEIs) 
environments. In preventing such violent radicalisation in UK universities, the Safe Campus 
Communities Programme (SCCP) was introduced albeit with skepticisms and criticisms from 
HEI managers and student groups.  
 
This thesis write-up studies the UK’s SCCP from the perspective of the law, the government, 
the history of radicalisation and counter-radicalisation in the UK and EU in general, students 
and HEI managers. It aims to study and analyse the Programme, its setbacks and its successes 
in preventing violent radicalisation in the UK and in UK HEIs. Aside from this, the write-up 
intends to explore the possibility of introducing a similar counter-radicalisation programme in 
Finnish HEIs by analysing how the SCCP’s website functions. Also, a survey of 46 respondents 
from Finnish Universities of Applied Sciences was conducted to understand how Finnish HEI 
students perceive such a counter-radicalisation programme for Finnish universities and 
colleges. 
 
The results from the analysis, survey and findings in this thesis write-up show where there are 
defects in carrying out the UK’s SCCP, the limitations of the Programme’s website and 
recommendations on how they can be corrected. It also opens the window to further future 
surveys and debates on the adoption or modification of such a programme for Finland.  
 
Finally, this thesis write-up exposes the misconceptions about violent radicals and extremists’ 
state of mind and the perceived conditions that lead individuals to violent radicalisation and 
extremism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Radicalisation, Violent Radicalisation, Extremism, Prevent Strategy, Safe Campus 
Communities Programme, Higher Education Institutions.
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 1 Introduction 
 
It is noteworthy to point out that over a million results pop up under 0.54 seconds when you 
search for ‘terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom’ on the search engine, Google, while a 
search for ‘counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies in the United Kingdom’ 
displays 305,000 results in 0.68 seconds. This is one way to glance at discussions and 
developments related to terrorism, and those related to preventing the factors that lead to it 
in the United Kingdom (UK). In the last few decades, the UK, and particularly, London, has 
been the epicentre for terrorist attacks. From the bombing campaigns of separatist groups 
like the Irish republican Army (IRA) that started in the 1970s up until 2011 (Global Terrorism 
Database), to Jihadi terrorism that currently remains a threat in the United Kingdom and 
around the world (MacLeod 2005), it is unsurprising that discussions have continued among 
policy makers, the academic and the public on what could be the factors behind such vicious 
attacks and the possible ways they can be effectively prevented. 
 
According to the European Police Office (EUROPOL) report on European Union Terrorism 
Situation and Trend Report (EUROPOL 2014, 46-47; 2015, 40-41; 2016, 44-45), a total of 152 
attacks (including successful, prevented and unsuccessful attacks) were carried out inside the 
European Union (EU), along with 535 arrests in the year 2013. In 2014, attacks rose to 201 
while arrests were at 774. In 2015 however, attacks within the EU rose again to 211, with 151 
recorded deaths, and 1077 terrorist-related arrests. Out of these 211 attacks, almost half of 
the figure, precisely, 103, were reported from the UK.  
 
ATTACKS IN EU (successful, 
prevented & unsuccessful) 
2013 2014 2015 
Attacks 152 (35 from 
UK) 
201 (109 from 
UK) 
211 (103 from 
UK) 
Arrests 535 (77 from 
UK) 
774 (132 from 
UK) 
1077 (134 from 
UK) 
Table 1: European Union terrorism Situation and Trend Report (2014, 2015 & 2016) 
 
From the report, the groups behind the 103 reported attacks from the UK in 2013, 2014 and 
2015 were not specified, thus, it is difficult to correctly analyse the groups responsible for 
the attacks and the trend of the attacks.  
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In another report by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the UK recorded attacks were 137 
in 2013, 103 in 2014 and 115 in 2015. The result shows a downward trend of attacks in 2014 
while attacks increased significantly in 2015. The EUROPOL and GTD report figures differ, 
perhaps due to their different approaches, information sources, reporting criteria and 
organisational considerations.  
 
Reports of devastating and deadly attacks are not limited to the United Kingdom, other 
European Union (EU) member States have had their bitter shares of terrorist attacks in recent 
time. Some of these attacks come with an unusually large number of fatalities (Foster 2017). 
 
Despite these sporadic and sometimes fatal attacks on EU soil, the governments and 
researchers in the EU have, lately, shifted attention from how to identify or profile terrorists 
to how violent radicalisation that leads to terrorism can be prevented, particularly, the 
attacks from ‘home-grown’ network of terrorists’ within the Union. 
 
There have been suggestions and policies by Expert Groups set-up by different international 
and regional organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the EU on how to prevent, halt 
or reduce the radicalisation process that leads to terrorism on potential victims (United 
Nations 2006; European Commission 2016). Also, some researchers, scholars and experts in 
the field of radicalisation and terrorism have come up with different measures they think can 
help the society in preventing the radicalisation process.  
 
From the different measures and programmes suggested by scholars and organisations in the 
field of radicalisation, the focus of this write-up will be centred on preventing radicalisation 
in the education sector in the UK and in Finland. The main question is, how can the education 
sector be used to prevent the violent radicalisation process that leads to violent extremism or 
terrorism? More specifically, focus will be on the effectiveness of the Safe Campus 
Communities Programme (SCCP) of the UK Universities.  
 
 
What does Safe Campus Communities Programme (SCCP) mean? 
 
The SCCP is one aspect of UK’s Prevent strategy. The Prevent strategy is one of the 4 
tentacles of the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy called CONTEST launched in 
2003. The other 3 tentacles of CONTEST are, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. CONTEST’s aim is 
to reduce the risk of terrorism to the UK and its interests abroad. The SCCP, as part of the 
Prevent strategy, is a legally binding strategy on all Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in 
England, Wales and Scotland on how to prevent their students from becoming violently 
radicalised.  
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The Guidance of Duty of the Prevent Strategy to higher and further education institutions was 
revised and re-presented in July of 2015 under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
which was enacted by the UK Parliament. It was then approved by the Parliament in 
September of the same year to give the Act a constitutional strength (UK Government 2016).  
 
The goal of the SCCP is to help promote debate and free speech, campus community safety 
(Safe Campus Communities n.d.), and also to protect vulnerable students from becoming 
radicalised (Home Office n.d).  
 
HEIs in England, Wales and Scotland (a different version was approved for Wales) have a legal 
duty to promote and secure the academic freedom and freedom of speech of students while 
also ensuring that universities’ environments and campuses are not turned into breeding 
grounds for violent radicals and extremists. These, according to the Act will be achieved by 
following the UK Prevent programme (Safe Campus Communities n.d.).  
 
This thesis write-up will focus attention on the roles the Safe Campus Communities 
Programme (SCCP) play in the overall anti-terrorism policy of the UK. How was the SCCP 
received by the HEI communities in the UK? And, is there the need for a programme like the 
SCCP in HEIs in Finland?  
 
The thesis survey questions seek students’ opinion on the adoption of the UK counter-
radicalisation programme for HEIs in Finland. Do students feel there is the need for a 
programme such as the SCCP in Finnish schools? Have students in Finland’s HEIs observed signs 
of extremism in fellow students? Do students of HEIs in Finland feel safe at all times during 
their studies? The answers to these questions will reflect the perception students’ have when 
it comes to their safety and security in Finnish HEIs and if they are in support of counter-
radicalisation programmes in their respective HEIs in Finland. 
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2 Conceptual Definitions 
 
There are thin lines that separate some of the terminology used in identifying, classifying, 
persuading or encouraging radicals to drop their violent ideologies or views, or those that 
concern preventing and reducing their potential to resort to terrorism. Sometimes, some of 
these terms are interchangeably but incorrectly used, perhaps due to the opinions that 
policymakers and the media have reflected on them. The definitions in this write-up are 
aimed at introducing the reader’s mind to the perspective of view of researchers in the field 
of radicalisation. The definitions will also open the readers’ mind to the distinctive 
differences among the terms.  
 
The definitions of terminologies used in the write-up are adopted from different academic, 
government and organisation’s point of views, however, emphasis will be given to the 
definitions from authorities from the United Kingdom due to their significance to this write-
up. Where there were no direct definitions, reputable scholars of social sciences and 
organisations definitions were adopted. 
 
Ideology 
 
According to the United Kingdom’s Prevent Strategy programme (2011, 107), ideology refers 
to some set of beliefs that an individual adopts in his/her everyday life. The Australian 
Government (n.d.) refers to ideology as a ‘significant shift’ in the manner an individual sees 
the world while Schmid, Jongman, and Price (2011, 643-644) defined ideology as systems of 
ideas that inform people about the workability of the social world, their supposed position in 
it and their responsibilities in such a society.  
 
Radicalisation 
 
Schmid (2013, 5) claimed that there is no definition of radicalisation that is generally 
acceptable either among scholars or governments. But, according to Dictionary.com, 
radicalisation is the noun form of the word ‘radical’ which comes from the Latin word ‘radix’, 
an adjective synonymous with the word ‘fundamental’, ‘basic’ or according to Schmid (2013, 
10) ‘root’. The word radical represents an undiluted and uncompromising political, social, 
environmental or religious ideology that most times differ from the general perspective of the 
majority of the society.  
 
The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (2009, 11) refers to 
radicalisation as the ‘process’ in which individuals decide to support violent extremism or join 
terrorist groups. 
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The European Commission (EC), under Migration and Home Affairs studies (2016) defined 
radicalisation as a ‘complex phenomenon’ of individuals adopting a radical ideology that 
could lead to the commitment of terrorist acts.  
 
To understand the best approaches toward counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation 
strategies, it is imperative to understand the elements that constitute radicalisation. What is 
common to these definitions is the fact that there is an extremist ‘ideology’ or ‘belief’ behind 
a radicalised individual that makes him/her susceptible to violence. It should also be noted 
that radicalisation, according to the definitions, is a ‘process’, that is, there are no definitive 
paths, factors or stages that lead individuals to it.  
 
Violent radicalisation 
 
The definition of violent radicalisation was not found on UK Government’s portals online. 
However, Hemert, Berg, Vliet, Roelofs, Veld, Marret, Gallucci and Feddes (2014, 5) argued 
that the term violent radicalisation was developed to distinguish between radicals who are 
non-violent and those who use violence or terror to project their cause. 
 
Reinares, Alonso, Bjorgo, Coolsaet, Della Porta, Khosrokhavar, Lohlker, Ranstorp, Schmid, 
Silke, Taarnby and De Vries (2008, 5) claimed that some experts believe violent radicalisation 
involves concrete violent behaviours while others believe that barely accepting certain 
ideologies that justify violence is a sign of violent radicalisation itself.  
Summarily, violent radicalisation can be understood as the socialisation to extremism that 
can manifest itself into terrorism (Reinares et al 2008, 7). 
 
Extremism 
 
The United Kingdom Government (2015, 9) defines extremism as the vocal or active 
opposition to British fundamental values, which includes democracy, individual liberty, rule 
of law and mutual tolerance and respect of divergent faiths and beliefs. In addition, calls for 
the death of members of British armed forces is categorised as extremism.  
 
Schmid (2013, 10), in an attempt to differentiate between radicals and extremists, argued 
that radicals tolerate divergent opinions, they are rational in thoughts and can be redeemed 
from their radical approach into the traditional societal inclination.  
On the other hand, Schmid pointed out that extremists’ mindsets are intolerable of divergent 
views, they are never democrats and are always willing to use violence if provided with the 
opportunity. The scholar claimed that radicals can either be democrats, use violence or 
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decide not to, while on the contrary, extremists are at all times ready to use force or 
violence in their agitation. 
 
Violent Extremism  
 
The United Kingdom’s Crown Prosecution Office (2011) define violent extremism as the 
showing of ‘unacceptable behaviour’ which supports the use of any means or medium to 
express views which may ‘foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence’ in advancing particular 
beliefs; seek to provoke others to terrorist acts; foment other serious criminal activity or seek 
to provoke others to serious criminal acts; or foster hatred which might lead to inter-
community violence in the UK. 
 
Terrorism 
 
In the UK Terrorism Act of 2000, terrorism is defined as the use or threat of action involving 
serious violence against an individual, damage to property, endangering another individual’s 
life, creating a serious risk to the health or safety of a section of a section or the whole 
public, interfering or disrupting electronic systems, making threatening statements to 
intimidate or influence government or the public including to advance political, religious or 
ideological cause, and/or the use or threat of use of firearms or explosives for either or not it 
is aimed towards influencing the government or intimidating the public. 
 
Crenshaw (1981, 380) claimed that the word terrorism was devised to indicate the systematic 
instigation of fear and anxiety that influences the activities of a civilian population. 
 
Borum (2004, 6) define terrorism as ‘acts of violence’ that are deliberately carried out on 
defenceless civilians with the aim of promoting some ‘ideological, religious or political 
objective’.  
 
Terrorist 
 
A terrorist is a radicalised individual who then commits an act of terror which affirms the 
radicalisation (Bigo et al 2014 11). 
 
Anti-radicalisation Programmes 
 
Anti-radicalisation programmes are used to explain the procedures applied to discourage and 
prevent radicalisation from occurring in the first place (Clutterbuck 2015). 
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Counter-radicalisation 
 
The United Kingdom Government, under Prevent Strategy (2011, 107) regards counter-
radicalisation as the activities focused on a group of individuals intended to prevent them 
from engaging in terrorist-related activities. 
 
The United Nations (UN 2006, 5) through its Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism 
that Lead to Terrorism defines counter-radicalisation as a collection of ‘social, political, 
legal, educational, and economic programs specifically designed to deter disaffected (and 
possibly already radicalised) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists’. 
 
Counter-radicalisation according to Horgan (2009, 153) is the efforts directed at preventing 
violent radicalisation or interrupting the continued involvement of radicals in terrorism. 
 
Vidino and Brandon (2012, 9) defines counter-radicalisation as a strategy with a set of policies 
and initiatives (either to de-radicalise, disengage, or prevent radicalisation), most times 
enshrined in a centrally-issued document with set goals describing methods and the 
responsibilities of participants in order to execute a government’s plan or effort to counter 
radicalisation. 
 
De-radicalisation 
 
For the United Kingdom’s Government (2011, 107), de-radicalisation programmes are 
measures that are intended to effect behavioural and cognitive change in individuals who 
support terrorist activities and those who have physically engaged in terrorism to have a new 
attitude on terrorism and/or disengage from it. 
 
Horgan (2009, 153) defines de-radicalisation as a ‘social and psychological process’ where a 
person’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalisation is significantly reduced to 
the levels that they are no longer at risk of involving or engaging themselves in violent 
activities, for example, terrorist acts. 
 
De-radicalisation according to the UN (2006, 5) involves programmes which are commonly 
directed against people who have become radicalised with the intention of reintegrating 
them into the society or at least prevent them from violent acts. 
 
According to Hemert et al (2014, 6), de-radicalisation essentially refers to a ‘cognitive 
rejection of certain values, attitudes and views’. The authors argued that de-radicalisation 
can happen both before and after any engagement in violence. 
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In all the definitions, it is clear that the aim of de-radicalising is to dissuade radicals from 
their views of promoting violence to achieve their aims and making them realise they are part 
of the society they intend to destroy. 
 
Disengagement 
 
The United Kingdom Government (2011, 107) refers to disengagement as the process where a 
person stops getting involved in terrorism while Hoeft (2015, 12) defines disengagement as 
the altering of violent behavioural traits of radicals that are necessary for their de-
radicalisation.  
 
Horgan (2009, 152) expatiates further, that, disengagement involves a change in 
responsibilities or functions that are most times related to a decrease in violent activities. 
This may not involve leaving the group but it is usually linked to a temporary or permanent 
change in responsibilities that are considerably notable.  
 
It is imperative to understand the elements that constitute radicalisation in order to be able 
to understand the best approaches toward counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation 
strategies. What is common to these definitions is the fact that there is an extremist 
‘ideology’ or ‘belief’ behind a radicalised individual that makes him/her susceptible to 
violence. It should also be noted that radicalisation, according to the definitions, is a 
‘process’, that is, there are no definitive paths, factors or stages that lead to it.  
 
From the authorities in the UK, radicalisation and its extreme effects are ideas or actions that 
strongly oppose the ‘fundamental values’ of the country, for example, its democracy, rule of 
law and public peace. The UK also regard violent radicalisation as ‘unacceptable behaviours’. 
Referring to radicalisation as ‘unacceptable behaviours’ and behaviours against the 
‘fundamental values of the UK’ seems ambiguous and, the two clauses have the tendencies of 
being manipulated to serve interests other than what it intends to serve.   
In other words, the definition does not specifically capture the unacceptable behaviours that 
qualify to be termed violent radicalisation.  
 
It was also observed that definitions have strong connections to who defines them. 
Government definitions focused on the maintenance of the rule of law, democracy, public 
peace and orderliness. On the other hand, scholars and organisations’ focus lies more on 
individual’s state of mind and the role their social environment plays in the long process of 
radicalisation that leads to terrorism. What this suggest is that scholars approach the issue of 
radicalisation from a holistic point of view, perhaps due to their apolitical stands while 
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governments are more concerned about maintaining the rule of law that their governance 
system is built upon and also protecting their democratic principles.  
 
 
3 Literature Review 
 
The study of counter-radicalisation is an emerging field of research, thus, there are different 
ideas and arguments on the best approaches toward preventing violent radicalisation by 
different scholars, governments and international organisations without general acceptance 
or application. Many of such ideas have generated debates and controversies, the same way 
their level of effectiveness have generated arguments. Scholars like Hoeft (2015, 6) and 
governments like the United Kingdom Government have proposed what can be regarded as 
‘soft approach’ to counter-radicalisation. The United Nations (UN) in 2006 also proposed what 
can be referred to as a soft approach towards preventing radicalisation. In Europe, countries 
like France, Italy and Spain have adopted the ‘hard approach’ to counter radicalisation (Bigo, 
Bonelli, Guittet & Ragazzi 2014, 18). 
 
Hoeft (2015, 6) explains that soft approach towards countering violent radicalisation are 
targeted towards winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of individuals who are vulnerable to violent 
radicalisation. He argued that such programmes can be achieved by using non-coercive means 
of engagement. Bigo et al (2014, 18) further state that soft approach involves preventing 
violent radicalisation by using a wide range of participants that include communities, non-
governmental organisations, the prison service and the local police. This partnership 
according to Bigo et al (2014, 18) serves as an accompaniment to the efforts of the judiciary 
and executive powers of government. 
 
In contrast, the hard approach has little or no recourse to community engagement. It relies 
on prosecution through the use of aggressive judicial processes, the use of administrative and 
that of the executive powers to prevent and foil attacks Bigo et al (2014, 18). 
 
There are researchers who have attempted to categorise counter-radicalisation in a broader 
and more comprehensive way. Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis (2015, 158) categorised 
counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism into two parts – reactive and preventive 
methods. The authors opined that reactive counter-radicalisation uses the justice system to 
prosecute people who are suspects of criminal activities according to relevant laws. 
Contrastingly, the preventive counter-radicalisation programme anticipates and prevents 
criminal acts that are related to terrorism before they occur.  
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In Europe, violent radicalisation issues and its prevention mechanisms became a popular 
discussion, particularly, among politicians and the academic after the Madrid bombing of 2004 
and the subsequent London bombing of 2005. It was after the two incidents that the word 
‘violent radicalisation’ was coined in Europe (Bakker 2006, 4; Schmid 2013, 1). Another 
explanation by Hemert et al (2014, 5) is that the term violent radicalisation was developed to 
distinguish between radicals who are non-violent and those who use violence or terror to 
project their cause. Kundnani (2012, 6) believed that the idea of ‘home-grown’ terrorists 
became popular after the two incidents of terrorism. Home-grown terrorists refer to terrorists 
who are born/raised in Europe. 
 
Before the Madrid 2004 and the London 2005 bombings, Europe has encountered a wave of 
nationalist, right- and left-wing terrorism in decades past. The UK, for example, was 
confronted with a nationalist movement known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from the 
1970s up until the 2000s, Spain battled with Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) or Basque 
Fatherland and Liberty from the late 1950s to 2011, West Germany was faced with the Red 
Army Faction (RAF) while some countries in parts of Africa, Asia, The Americas and Europe 
were faced with different neo-Nazi groups (Bakker 2006, 3-4). 
 
In recent years, however, the number of attacks in Europe has surged while their level of 
sophistication and devastation have equally increased. According to EUROPOL (2016, 10), in 
2015, attacks within the EU rose to 211, with 151 recorded deaths as compared to 201 attacks 
in 2014. France suffered the highest casualty figures, particularly from Jihadi attacks, while 
the UK recorded the highest number of attacks. Other countries that suffered massive 
casualties include Germany and Belgium. EUROPOL is yet to release its 2016 official figures, 
but considering terrorist attacks in Europe in the past year, the casualty figure from terrorist 
attacks is likely to be on the increase.  
 
Historically, the study of counter-radicalisation programmes in the European Union (EU) 
started with government officials in The Netherlands after the 2005 London bombing. These 
officials believed such programmes can help forestall terrorist acts inside the EU. They were 
of the opinion that the understanding of individual’s or group’s ‘indicators’ that may lead to 
terrorism can be used to develop warning signs to detect religious violence. However, instead 
of venturing into the research of understanding the factors that lead European citizens to 
terrorism, the Dutch scholars and researchers in this emerging field focused on techniques 
that can be used in identifying potential terrorists or supporters of extremist ideologies that 
may lead to terrorism in The Netherlands (Kundnani 2012, 6). 
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Apart from The Netherlands early researchers, different scholars from around the world have 
also contributed to discussions about radicals and radicalism. Some of these researchers focus 
on the factors that lead to violent radicalisation. Among these factors, ideology stands out. 
Schmid (2013, 9), Neumann (2010, 12), Kundnani (2012, 4), Cincu (2016, 18) all agreed that 
ideology plays a significant role in the factors that lead to violent radicalisation. Sabir (2016) 
however concluded that there appears to be a consensus among the academics and 
counterterrorism experts that the presence of unjust and unfair political and socio-economic 
practicalities gives ‘sanctity and legitimacy’ to violent ideology.  
 
Some scholars agree that grievances in form of inequities, marginalisation, humiliation 
(particularly those concerning religious, political, cultural or ethnic groups), under-
employment, poor education, foreign policies and conflicts, disenfranchisement and 
unemployment/under-employment are some of the issues that contribute to the factors that 
lead to violent radicalisation (Reinares et al 2008, 9). In their conclusion, Reinares et al 
(2008, 12) identify ‘ideological activists’ as an important recruitment tool in the 
radicalisation process that leads to terrorism. Ideological activists, according to the scholars 
are individuals who possess appealing characteristics, are learned, and integrates well with 
the society they live in. Most of these activists have an unflinching sense of justice, are seen 
as role models within their locality and are inspired by their strong idealistic beliefs. 
 
Apart from grievance, researchers and experts in the field of security studies at a conference 
in London convened by the TRENDS Research and Advisory and the International Centre for 
the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) in 2016 claimed that identity crises, 
mental health issues and criminal activities contribute to factors that lead to violent 
radicalisation. Rik Coolsaet stated at the conference that some individuals are motivated by 
terrorist organisations who they see as super-gangs and tend to join these groups even 
without understanding their ideology (Moos 2016). This notion was supported by Basra, 
Neumann and Brunner (2016, 23), the authors found out that criminals are justifying their 
criminal activities by joining jihadist groups while also using their violent radicalisation to 
‘clear’ their past sins’. 
 
Interestingly, other researchers believe that social issues such as family background, personal 
experience, friendship, involvement in high-risk activism and political affiliations can lead to 
violent radicalisation (Reinares et al 2008, 9; Bigo et al 2014, 13). In Australia, the 
government through its Living Safe Together programme believes ideology is the number one 
cause of radicalisation. The Australian government, however, noted that ideologies are not a 
cause for concern unless there are calls for the use of violence or unlawful acts to promote 
such beliefs.  
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In another perspective, Schmid (2013, 2) faults some of the assumptions by scholars that 
political, social, religious or cultural discontents stimulate the process of violent 
radicalisation. He argued that such assumptions are ambiguous and lack formal investigation 
while also suggesting that the actors (terrorists) themselves should be interrogated in order to 
understand their perspective on the issues surrounding the factors that lead to violent 
radicalisation. The author grouped the root causes of violent radicalisation into Micro, Meso- 
and Macro levels to categorise and simplify the different levels that contribute to violent 
radicalisation. 
 
Micro-level: The micro level factors deal with the individual’s cause of influence. For 
example, failed integration, feelings of isolation, discrimination, direct or indirect 
humiliation, rejection and stigmatisation, most times, combined with feelings of vengeance 
and moral outrage can lead to violent radicalisation (Schmid 2013, 4). 
 
Meso-level: Meso-level deals with the bigger society that supports or get involved in 
individuals’ quest for vengeance. It serves as the ‘missing link’ with the extremists’ larger 
society or like-minded aggrieved groups who shares the same grievances. The group, 
according to Schmid (2013, 4) can serve as a recruitment base for radicalisation that may lead 
to violent radicalisation.  
 
Macro-level: The macro-level as expressed by Schmid (2013, 4) is influenced by the role of 
government and the society at large, either home or abroad. It can also be influenced by 
perceived unjustifiable public opinion, party politics, tense ethnic minority versus majority 
relationships, and the effect of lacking socio-economic opportunities which may together lead 
to the coming together of these individuals and the radicalisation of dissatisfied members 
which might result in violent extremism. 
 
The difference in opinions of scholars and researchers in the field of radicalisation have 
clearly shifted from claims that terrorists and violent extremists are mentally unstable, 
senseless or depressed. As explained by Reinares et al (2008, 9), Crenshaw (1981, 380), 
Horgan (2009, xii) and Sageman (2004, 97), violent radicals are neither depressed, irrational, 
emotionally unbalanced, nor senselessly involved in extremism. To put their description in 
proper perspective, there is nothing like a terrorist personality (Crenshaw 2006, 7; 2000, 409; 
Alonso et al 2008, 11; Bigo, Bonelli, Guittet & Ragazzi 2014, 11). However, Horgan (2009, 3) 
argued that the issue of violent extremists or terrorists’ state of mind is contentious, thus, 
claims that they are psychologically normal is inaccurate. In addition, the author claimed that 
what constitutes abnormality to researchers differ. 
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In general, it is safe to conclude that grievances against the society, either justifiably or 
unjustifiably, contribute to what lead individuals to violent radicalisation or extremism. Such 
grievances can emanate from political, religious, cultural or socio-economic tendencies which 
may, in turn, fuel and validate inherent violent ideology. However, from the different 
suggestions and research results studied, there appears to be no definite or specific pathway 
that leads to violent radicalisation. It is observed that what some individuals perceive to be 
grievances against their community or country may be wished away by others, and what leads 
some individuals to violent radicalisation do not necessarily lead others to it. This fact 
neutralises the idea of designing a terrorist personality and claims that an entire religion or 
societal group should be targeted for extremist signs. In fact, there are arguments by some 
researchers that insanity contributes to violent radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Does 
that mean that all mentally unstable people are radicals? The answer is a definite no. 
 
All in all, these findings tend to show that one form of counter-radicalisation programme 
cannot be suitable for all forms of violent radicalisation. And the best approach to counter 
some of these factors is to first understand what led to them. Thus, a counter-radicalisation 
programme for one community or society may not necessarily be effective for another. 
 
In the UK, there is a history of using legislative and judicial powers to prohibit, prevent and 
deter individuals from spreading hate, violence or terrorism in order to agitate for a cause. 
The next sub-heading explains some of the historical efforts taken in the UK to counter the 
effects of radicalisation and violent radicalisation. 
 
3.1 Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation Programmes in the UK. 
 
Since the 1970s, the United Kingdom had enacted different laws aimed at prohibiting 
members of the public from joining or supporting the ideology of radical, extremist and 
separatist movements by criminalising such practices. Some of the groups that operated in 
the 1970s include the Sinn Fein Movement, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) (Bowcott 2014). 
 
The UK government responded by enacting major laws that are targeted toward combating 
violent radicalisation and extremism. Common among these laws are, the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act of 1974, the Broadcasting Ban of 1988 (which was dismissed in 1994) (Bowcott 
2014), the Terrorism Act of 2006 (enacted to update the Terrorism Act of 2000 after the 
London 2005 bombings), the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act of 2011, and 
more recently, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 that encompasses the Prevent 
strategy (UK Government 2009, 14; Blackbourn 2016).  
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Some of these Acts are directed toward counterterrorism, and in recent time, others are 
directed toward counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism.  
 
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act through the Prevent Strategy focused specifically on 
some areas of life, one of which is the education sector. This is because there appears to be a 
lot of issues associated with radicalisation in Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in the UK. 
These issues were reflected in the Prevent Strategy document published by the government in 
2011 (72). For example, the government found out that over 30% of individuals convicted of 
terrorism-related offences between 1999 and 2009 had attended a university or higher 
education institution of study. In another discovery, the government found out that 15% of 
convicted individuals graduated from either a further education institution or a vocational 
school while another 10% were either students’ when they were charged or convicted. 
 
STATUS (students) % BETWEEN 1999-2009 
Attended university convictions 30% 
Graduates from vocational/further 
education schools 
15% 
Studying at time of arrest or conviction 10% 
Table 2: Statistics of students involved in terrorism in UK HEIs. 
 
The government believes that there are students who are already radicalised before gaining 
admissions into HEIs while others become radicalised during their studies in UK HEIs. One of 
such cases of radicalisation during studies is the Iraqi-Swede, Taimour Abdulwahab Al-
Abdaly who studied at the University of Bedfordshire and died in a failed attack in 
Sweden in 2010 (Prevent Strategy 2011, 72). The government is also of the opinion that 
there is a growing diversity, sophistication and unpredictability of terrorism in the UK which 
does not isolate HEIs from recruiters and influencers of these acts (United Kingdom 
Government 2012, 1). 
 
Choudhury and Fenwick in their 2011 research (67) claimed that the July 7, 2005, attacks on 
the transport network in London gave birth to debates about the instantaneous and 
intermediate actions that the government needed to address to stem the wave of 
islamophobia in schools, and at the same time prevent students from becoming radicalised 
within their school environments. 
 
In addition to these developments, there is a growing number of school pupils joining ISIS 
which is worrying to the government. In 2013, Glasgow University student, Aqsa Mahmood 
travelled to Syria to join ISIS and had since become a recruiter of the group calling on Muslims 
who cannot make the journey to commit terrorist acts back home. Also, in 2015, three British 
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schoolgirls, Amira Abase, Shamima Begum and Kadiza Sultana left their homes in London and 
travelled to Syria to join ISIS (Webb 2016).  
 
Some of these widely publicised cases of students joining ISIS may have contributed to 
creating the Safe Campus Communities Programme to prevent and halt the radicalisation 
process in schools, particularly HEIs.  
 
Considering also, EUROPOL’s 2016 (10) report which reveals that the UK recorded the highest 
number of attacks in Europe in 2015, coupled with a report by the UK Foreign Secretary that 
over 1500 Brits have attempted to enter Syria in the last four years with the aim of joining 
ISIS (Groves 2016), it should not be surprising that the UK government is taking serious and 
concrete measures that include programmes aimed at preventing violent radicalisation in HEIs 
in the UK. 
 
Aside from these developments, questions have also been raised about the medium of 
communication among like-minded people or groups recruiting and propagating ideologies of 
extremist nature in schools. It has been recognised that face-to-face interaction remains the 
most effective means of recruitment. However, the role of the internet has also been 
emphasised to be critical in the recruitment process (Prevent Strategy 2011, 46-47).  
 
In all of these, Universities UK, the umbrella body for all Universities in the UK denied 
that universities serve as grounds for violent radicalisation. The Federation of Student 
Islamic Societies also denied reports that HEIs serve as breeding grounds for violent 
radicalisation, stating that such reports are inconclusive, yet are sensationalised (House 
of Commons 2012, 14). 
 
As part of the larger society that the universities are not isolated from, there is a tendency 
that some vulnerable students can be lured into violent radicalisation. Considering the 
youthfulness, exposure and freedom of expression and association that students enjoy, there 
are chances that some of the students may misuse these opportunities to the detriment of the 
larger society (Prevent Strategy 2011, 72). 
 
It is widely believed that the thriving and successful indoctrination of people into violent 
radicalisation and extremism are not cases in isolation, there are different views of injustices 
that are related to social, religious and political issues that fuel such developments according 
to the Home Affairs Committee of the UK House of Commons (2012, 89). However, 
indoctrination of individuals has continued to occur despite the UK’s multicultural system that 
tries to promote integration and tolerance among immigrant communities (Cincu 2016, 17).  
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To understand why the UK has taken stringent measures to prevent radicalisation, it is 
important to understand what the government perceives to be the root causes of 
radicalisation.  
 
In a report by the United Kingdom’s House of Commons Home Affairs Committee in 2012 (9-
10), ideology, theology, mental health issues, grievances and social exclusion are argued as 
the pathway that leads to radicalisation in the UK. However, the report noted that the issue 
of social exclusion is less convincing while grievances play a leading role. The report cited 
that Maajid Nawaz, a former member of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (a pan-Islamic political organisation), 
expressed that his grievances against the State were as a result of his experiences of violent 
racism, falling victim of a stabbing, false arrest by the police and his view on the Bosnia 
crisis.  
 
The UK government in 2012 (3) in response to the House of Commons report concluded that 
feelings of alienation from the society, sense of grievance (for example, due to racism and 
discrimination), islamophobia and lack of trust or confidence in constituted authorities are 
the drivers of radicalisation. Both reports emphasised that violent radicalisation is more 
pronounced among the youths and those of lower income and socio-economic groups in the 
UK. Conclusions that may have impacted the Prevent Strategy’s focus on HEIs. 
 
These conclusions, however, do not completely answer the questions about students who 
have in subsequent years travelled to war-torn countries to join terrorist organisations. Some 
of those who have travelled to Syria and Iraq, for example, are compelled to do so under an 
illusion that those States are ruled or will be ruled under strict Islamic jurisprudence that is 
lacking in the UK and not necessarily that they have genuine grievances against the UK. This 
can be noticed on Webb’s report of 2016 which was posted on the Mirror UK website. The 
report focused on young women from the UK who travelled to Syria to join the Islamic State. 
 
3.2 UK’s Prevent Strategy 
 
The UK Prevent Strategy operates under CONTEST, an umbrella programme for counter-
terrorism strategy in the UK with four tentacles: Pursue, Protect, Prepare and Prevent. These 
programmes function under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act which was first 
introduced in 2003 but given legislative power in September 2015.  
 
The aims of the Prevent Strategy are, stopping the violent radicalisation of vulnerable 
individuals, reducing support for violent extremism and terrorism and discouraging individuals 
from becoming violently radicalised which may lead them to acts of terrorism. It also covers 
extreme right wing groups. (UK Government 2009, 14; 2012, 1; Blackkbourn 2016).  
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The ‘Safe Campus Communities Programme’ (SCCP) was set-up under the Prevent Strategy. 
The programme specifically focuses on all Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in England, 
Wales and Scotland. Its aim is to prevent vulnerable students of HEIs from becoming violently 
radicalised, particularly within their school environments. The goal of the SCCP is to help 
promote debate and free speech and, above all, maintain campus community safety (Safe 
Campus Communities n.d., Home Office n.d.).  
 
As a law, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 provides all HEIs and staff in 
England, Wales and Scotland (different version was approved for Wales) the legal duty to 
promote and secure students’ freedom of speech and study, while also ensuring that the 
universities’ environments and campuses are not turned into breeding grounds for violent 
radicals and extremists. By following the Prevent Strategy Programme, the UK Government is 
optimistic that these responsibilities can be achieved (Safe Campus Communities Programme 
n.d.).  
 
The UK Government focuses its attention on students of HEIs because, it is believed that, 
demographically, the youths are more susceptible to violent radicalisation than any other 
group, and statistically, terrorist acts are committed more by individuals who are less than 30 
years of age (Prevent Strategy 2011, 64), hence focus should be shifted to higher school of 
learning where the youths can be largely found. 
 
In Part 5, section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015, statutory 
responsibilities are placed on some specified government agencies. These responsibilities are 
referred to as ‘Guidance Duty’. The duties statutorily make it the responsibility of these 
authorities to ‘prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. The government agencies 
being referred to are highlighted under Schedule 6 of the Act. They are local government 
officials, criminal justice executioners, education and childcare managers, health and social 
care boards, and the police (The National Archives n.d.).  
 
The SCCP falls under the ‘education and childcare managers’ category of the Prevent 
Strategy. Its aim, as specified in the Act, is for education managers to prevent students from 
being ‘drawn into terrorism’ while discharging their duties. HEI’s managers (Vice-Chancellors, 
University Chairs, Chaplains, Legal Practitioners, Chief Security Officers and Student Support 
Services) are responsible for carrying out the Prevent Strategy duties in HEIs. However, many 
have involved students in consultations and engagements on how they can implement the 
Prevent Duties in their respective groups (The National Archives n.d.).  
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The SCCP equally has a dedicated website known as the Safe Campus Communities where 
relevant information related to the Prevent Strategy programme and Guidance Duty of 
education managers can be accessed by both HEI managers and their students. The website is 
comprehensively discussed under Findings and Analysis of this thesis write-up. 
 
Apart from the available information on the SCCP website, there are other different 
programmes designed for universities in the UK on how to prevent violent radicalisation while 
equally ensuring that the freedom of speech of students is not impeded. This is because it is 
believed that universities have different peculiarities which may, in effect, make the 
programmes ineffective in preventing violent radicalisation in HEI environments. However, 
there are four major guidelines (legal responsibilities, information management, interfaith 
relations and external speakers’ management) that universities are expected to follow in the 
discharge of their Prevent Duties. These guidelines provide HEIs with information on how to 
address relevant yet controversial issues in university environments (Safe Campus 
Communities n.d.).  
 
3.3 Impact of the Safe Campus Communities Programme (SCCP) 
 
As presented in the introduction of this write-up, it is difficult to faultlessly analyse the 
positive impacts of counter-radicalisation programmes designed for a community or an entire 
nation. This also applies to the UK counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation programmes. 
The initiator of the SCCP (the government) has continued to argue that the programme has 
recorded considerable successes while critics are critical of the negative impacts arising from 
the introduction of the programme. However, like every other programme, the SCCP has its 
positive and negative impacts on UK universities. 
 
Remarkably, the Prevent Strategy through the SCCP has made it possible for HEIs managers to 
have a legal backing on the prevention of violent radicalisation in HEIs environments, albeit 
with guidelines. The Programme has also encouraged HEI managers to set-up guidelines for 
downloading sensitive information for students’ research purposes, for example, the 
downloading of terrorist organisations propaganda materials from online sources for research 
purposes. The guidelines provide students with the procedures on how security-sensitive 
materials can be downloaded without encountering problems with the security agencies (Safe 
Campus Communities Programme n.d). 
 
Apart from the legal framework and guidelines on how sensitive material can be downloaded 
from online sources, the effective management of interfaith activities in universities and 
colleges of education has also been made possible by the introduction of the SCCP. Different 
religious groups are now aware of the rules guiding their activities. They are also aware of the 
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activities or lectures that are regarded as promoting incitements in HEI environments (Safe 
Campus Communities Programme n.d.). 
 
The SCCP has also helped in raising students’ level of awareness about the threat of violent 
radicalisation and extremism on HEIs premises. Many HEIs in the UK presently have guidelines 
in place for visiting speakers before they can be allowed to give lectures on campuses. 
Lectures that promote, for example, extremist views are not tolerated in many HEIs. Failure 
of speakers to strictly abide by these guidelines may result in cancellation of such lectures 
(House of Commons 2012, 21). 
 
In addition, the general belief that university environments can pose a threat to vulnerable 
individuals from getting radicalised and that universities can serve as recruitment grounds for 
violent extremists was in part agreed to by Universities UK, the umbrella body for all 
universities in the UK. Thus, the body advised universities to be more active with activities 
related to the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism on universities and colleges 
of education campuses. Such a call serves as a boost for counter-radicalisation programmes in 
HEIs in the UK. (House of Commons 2012, 21). These admittances may likely encourage 
universities to be more proactive about the implementation of the measures in the Prevent 
Strategy for HEIs. 
 
Furthermore many institutions in the UK have set-up different teams to ensure that key staff 
members can be able to identify vulnerable students and promptly offer professional supports 
while students are also guided on their duties and responsibilities to prevent violent 
radicalisation on campuses. This was made possible by the introduction of the SCCP (House of 
Commons 2012, 21). 
 
Moreover, the SCCP has encouraged the National Union of Students (NUS) and the Business 
Innovation and Skills department (BIS) in the UK to develop training materials for their 
employees dealing with student union organisations as a result of the SCCP. Also, the NUS has 
been prompted by the SCCP to initiate a ‘No Platform’ guideline. This guideline prohibits staff 
members of the NUS from sharing a stage with ‘racists’, ‘extremists’ or those deem as 
‘fascists’ (Prevent Strategy 2011, 74).  
 
Apart from the ‘No Platform’ guideline, the NUS also partners with a number of student 
organisations in the UK to prevent extremism and violent radicalisation in those organisations. 
One of such organisations is the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) (the umbrella 
body for Islamic societies in the UK). The Programme has also encouraged local authorities 
like the police and youth and probation services to work together with universities and 
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colleges of education in the UK to prevent violent radicalisation (Prevent Strategy 2011, 74-
75). 
 
In all, the results of these measures on the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism 
on campuses remain contentious. However, it cannot be denied that the measures taken have 
increased awareness level on HEI’s campuses. The awareness level may likely force radicals to 
go underground or shift their attention from HEIs campuses to other areas outside the 
education sector for recruitment purposes. In addition to these, the fear of being detected is 
likely to hinder the activities of extremists in universities and colleges of education. On the 
whole, it cannot be generally concluded that the Prevent Strategy through the SCCP has made 
no significant achievement or progress in HEIs, However, it remains to be seen if the SCCP 
can totally eliminate, or rather prevent violent radicalisation and extremism from all HEI 
environments in the UK. 
 
3.4 Safe Campus Communities Programme Setbacks 
 
The Prevent Strategy report of 2011 (75-76) found out that some universities and colleges fail 
to engage in the Prevent Strategy. It was reported that universities partner more with local 
authorities than the colleges do. It also noted that the colleges take less seriously the Prevent 
Strategy programmes than the universities despite the fact that both are equally open 
environments where violent radicalisation can take place. 
 
There were also observations of poor links between universities, colleges, the communities 
and local authorities in carrying out their Prevent duties (Prevent Strategy 2011, 76).  
 
Beider and Briggs, in a 2010 (15) survey of HEIs, observed that a considerable number of HEIs 
staff lack the skills and confidence to deliver the agenda of the Prevent Strategy while many 
others are unwilling to carry out their duties due to fear of discriminating students or the fear 
of being attacked. They also found out in their survey that there is a lack of cooperation 
between the police and HEIs.  
 
In another research carried out by Choudhury and Fenwick (2011, 68-69) some interviewees 
(mainly Muslim University students) believe that they are under ‘siege and surveillance’ by 
security agencies in the UK as a result of their active participations in Islamic, social or 
political activities.  
 
Others raised questions about how their information may be shared among different security 
agencies which may lead to thorough scrutiny and even visa denials at airports. These have 
resulted in solidarity protests even among non-Muslims while other Muslim students have 
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simply abstained from Muslim organisations for fear of being witch-hunted or discriminated 
against. 
 
Apart from discrimination issues, lack of funding is also seen as a significant hindrance to the 
Prevent Strategy because many HEI unions/organisations are unable to fund the training of 
their employees in carrying out their responsibilities in the Prevent Strategy programme 
(Prevent Strategy 2011, 76). 
 
In another development, before the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act was passed in 
September of 2015, 525 professors from different universities and colleges of education were 
critical of the proposed law. They raised concerns about the effects of the law in the 
preservation of the freedom of speech enjoyed by HEIs and their students. Concerns were also 
raised about what they termed ‘unlawful and unenforceable’ responsibilities that the law 
tends to place on HEIs staff by identifying and preventing students’ who are susceptible to 
violent radicalisation from getting radicalised (The Guardian 2015). 
 
The professors argued that only an open and democratic society that encourages debate of 
controversial issues and challenges discriminatory behaviours can successfully combat and 
prevent terror acts.  They reminded the UK government that the new law will contradict the 
principle of academic freedom in universities and colleges guaranteed by the UK Education 
Act of 1986 (The Guardian 2015).  
 
For HEI professors (over 500 of them) to have raised questions and concerns about the 
negative effects that a proposed law would have on HEIs shows that the law does not enjoy 
collective support from those who have important roles to play in effecting the law.  
 
All in all, there has been several concerns that have been raised by both government officials 
and HEI managers. Some of these concerns may have been captured in the Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act updated and passed in 2015, however, there appears to be significant 
reluctance on the part of HEI managers to carry out their tasks as stipulated in the Act. These 
may be due to personal safety, fear of discrimination, blackmail, lack of proper skill and 
guidance, or lack of true understanding of their role in the Prevent Strategy. Also, 
cooperation among authorities, like the police, communities and HEIs appears not to be 
cordial as a result of jurisdictional issues and inter-agency suspicions. In addition, students 
who are members of Islamic organisations on campuses also have their suspicions and 
reservations about the SCCP.  
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Some of these students believe that the programme is unfairly targeted at Muslim students 
for the aim of gathering intelligence about their private life. It is, therefore, the duty of the 
government agencies in charge of the SCCP to restore confidence in the programmes 
stakeholders by carrying everyone along and proving to the different groups that the 
programme does not solely focus attention on them or their communities if they aim to 
achieve success and make a meaningful impact. 
 
Another observation is that the SCCP website does not provide much information about the 
primary targets of the programme – the students. Although there are a considerable number 
of materials for HEIs employees to study and understand their roles in the Prevent Strategy 
programme which students may have access to, most of the materials, however, appear to be 
irrelevant to vulnerable students who need assistance in the prevention of the violent 
radicalisation process. 
 
3.5 Criticisms of the Prevent Strategy Programme 
 
There are Muslim communities in the UK who see the whole Prevent Strategy programme as a 
way for the government to snoop on their private life and create suspicion and enmity among 
British Muslims. 
 
Kundnani (2009, 8) concluded after interviewing 32 workers working for the Prevent Strategy 
programme that the Strategy specifically targets Muslims who are British citizens in a complex 
structure of surveillance, propaganda, mapping and engagement because it sees the Muslim 
communities as a ‘suspect community’. He regarded the Prevent Strategy as the UK 
government’s ‘Islam policy’ that can be used to promote social divisions and encourage 
privacy violations of Muslims. He argued that the Prevent Strategy programme at best is 
counter-productive in reducing the risk of ‘political violence’. 
 
Confirming Kundnani’s findings, the House of Commons (2012, 46) reported that some Muslim 
communities see Prevent Strategy as an essential ‘tool’ for spying and gathering intelligence 
about Muslim communities. 
 
Another setback for the Prevent Strategy is that it lacks the confidence of some influential 
Muslim organisations (Muslim Association of Britain or Muslim Council of Britain or the Islamic 
Society of Britain) that the government dropped from the programme due to the 
government’s belief that they are ‘Islamist’ in nature. Many of these neglected organisations 
are however seen as legitimate by the majority of British Muslims while the organisations 
involved by the UK government are seen as ‘government mouthpieces’ (Bigo et al 2014, 29). 
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Some of these issues and suspicions that are raised by different groups particularly the Muslim 
communities as a result of the Prevent Strategy programme can be addressed by the 
government. The UK government must find a way to restore confidence and convince Muslim 
communities and organisations in the UK that the real intention of the programme is not to 
gather intelligence or spy on them, but to work and partner with them to prevent violent 
radicalisation and extremism within the UK. The government must also assure communities, 
particularly the minority groups among them that the programme does not specifically target 
their communities but generally focuses on the larger society.  
 
 
4 Methodology 
 
Methodology, according to Kumar (2008, 5), is used to methodically solve research problems. 
The author explained that research methods are part of research methodology. He further 
stated that research methodology takes into consideration not only research methods but also 
the reasons behind adopting such specific method of research against the others in order to 
be able to evaluate such research work.  
 
Creswell (2014, 3) explained that research method is based on the description of the research 
problem(s), the personal experiences of the researcher in charge and the study target 
audience. The author pointed out that there are three approaches to research methods: 
qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods.  
 
Qualitative research method explores human and social problems in order to understand their 
meaning. Such research requires procedures, asking pertinent questions and using relevant 
information/data collected from contributors in making informed analysis and interpretation 
of such data. Qualitative research can be unstructured or semi-structured in nature. (Creswell 
2014, 4). 
 
In contrast, quantitative research method tests theories by impartially scrutinising the 
correlations that exist among variables. Such variables in form of data can then be analysed 
and measured numerically using statistical techniques. Quantitative research, unlike 
qualitative research, has a set structure (Creswell 2014, 4).  
 
According to Creswell (2014, 4), in summary, qualitative research relies on words, open-
ended interviews/questions, case studies and making observations as a strategy, while 
quantitative research uses numerical data, close-ended questions and experimentations in 
collecting and analysing its data. 
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The Mixed research method combines both qualitative and quantitative research methods and 
may involve theoretical and philosophical assumptions to collect and integrate data, using 
designs that are well defined to produce a comprehensive and better understanding of 
research problems that either qualitative or quantitative research produces (Creswell 2014, 
4). 
 
Newman and Benz (1998, 9-10) concluded that qualitative method of research covers 
theories, case studies, document studies, interview studies, field studies, naturalistic 
enquiries and descriptive studies. They asserted that most times, qualitative research designs 
capture one case study or subject of research over a period of time and is often times 
associated with social sciences. On the other hand, quantitative research method according 
to Newman and Benz (1998, 10), deals with statistical or empirical studies and have been the 
dominating research method in social science.  
 
In deciding the methodology to be used in this research, questions that were asked include: 
how do I study and analyse a website objectively and meaningfully? Is my topic a case study 
(reading, collecting and analysing certain information) or a scientific measurement of a 
theory using numbers? How do I make a reasonable expression of my results? Is it by 
representing my analysis in words or by presenting them in numbers? Who is/are my audience? 
And what experience do I have in data analysis? 
 
In answering the above questions, I realised that, to be able to analyse and interpret my 
findings, and with my limited experience, qualitative research method has the features that 
best describes my work, according to Creswell (2014, 4) and Newman and Benz’s (1998, 9-10) 
description of qualitative research method. Also, the method can effectively provide the 
required answers to the questions asked.   
 
In addition, I have an established topic (a case which is the SCCP) which needs to be studied, 
analysed and interpreted in words (qualitative), the only effective and objective way they 
can be presented. Apart from this, there are issues like the impacts, setbacks and criticisms 
of the Programme while also focusing on the functionalities, structure, accessibility and 
contents that the Programme’s website contains. These are human and social issues that 
require information about the Programme, analysing such information and interpreting their 
meanings in words using the available information (website and researchers works) as defined 
by (Creswell 2014, 4).  
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The semi-structured nature of the research is also a feature associated with qualitative 
research. There was no definitive or specific structure that was adopted from the beginning 
of the research, it was open and flexible which makes changes and modifications easy to 
achieve. This is characteristic of a qualitative research, according to Creswell (2014, 4). 
 
Apart from the website’s study, a student survey was also conducted. The student survey 
explores students’ opinions on counter-radicalisation programmes for HEIs, and also their 
perception of safety in Finnish HEIs.  
Many of the respondents (students) surveyed were surveyed within the premises of a 
University of Applied Sciences. They were mainly given the hard copies of the questionnaire 
in the library and in other open areas of the campus. Other respondents answered the survey 
questions through a web link posted on a student life related Facebook group page. 
  
In total, 40 hard copies of the questionnaires were printed, while 35 were responded to. From 
the online version, 11 were answered bringing the total number of respondents to 46 which is 
comparatively, two classes of students in a typical HEI in Finland. The total number of 
questions in the questionnaire are 11. 
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5 Findings and Analysis 
 
The results of the research were divided into two, the desk research analysis of the SCCP and 
the student survey. 
 
5.1 Desk Research Description, Analysis and Assessment of the SCCP Website 
 
The SCCP website and its contents were observed, analysed, described and assessed. The 
assessment of the website was done based on four parameters: accessibility, material 
contents, security, and its structure and usability. 
 
From the SCCP’s website study and observation, a register/login area was noted which, as 
expressed on the website, is restricted only to ‘Higher Education sector’ users (I was able to 
register and access it irrespective). It also has a search area where search inquiries are 
redirected to the resources section of the website for similar materials. There is equally the 
same set of information for visitors and log-in users on the main menus of the website except 
for the Training and Forum sections (the Forum section is only available to log-in users while 
training materials can only be viewed after sign-in) (Safe Campus Communities, n.d.).  
 
In addition, materials related to the Prevent Strategy programme are displayed randomly on 
the website for casual users’ but remain stable for log-in users on the ‘Organisations’ section. 
 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot of the registration page on the Safe Campus Communities Programme 
website (05.02.2017). 
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The SCCP’s website is designed for use by both students and HEI’s managers’. It has 8 sections 
for visitors and 9 sections for log-in users. The sections altogether have 20 subsections. These 
sections include Resources, The Prevent Agenda, General Guidance, Role-Specific Guidance, 
Organisations, Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) Monitoring, Training 
(with materials for log-in users), Forum (exclusively for log-in users) and, News (Safe Campus 
Communities Programme n.d).  
 
 
Figure 2: SCCP's page after a user is logged-in to the site (Notice the training and forum 
sections. The training material modules can be seen in the screenshot). (05.02.2017). 
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Below is the menu sections and their subsections as available on the Safe Campus 
Communities Programme website. 
Table 3: Safe Campus Communities Programme Website Menu and Submenu sections. 
 
Each menu (and submenus) on the SCCP website has its functions. Below are the functions of 
the different menus on the SCCP website. 
 
The Resources Section 
 
The Resources section displays important materials that can be used by HEIs in the discharge 
of their Prevent duties. The section has two subsections; Case Studies and Understanding the 
Issues. The Case Studies subsection provide information about case studies on related topics 
while the Understanding the Issues subsection provides information about research papers and 
guidance information on how to carry out Prevent duties according to the law. Suggestions 
can also be submitted to a dedicated e-mail on the Case Studies subsection (Safe Campus 
Communities Programme n.d). 
 
The Prevent Agenda Section 
 
The Prevent Agenda section explains the aim of CONTEST with regards to the overall counter-
terrorism strategy; Pursue, Protect, Prepare and Prevent strategies which are all part of 
CONTEST. It has five subsections, namely, Prevent in my Region, What Prevent Means to HEIs, 
Channel, Risk Factors and Risks to Individuals (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d). 
 
                                                            SECTIONS 
 Resources The Prevent 
Agenda 
General 
Guidance 
Role-specific 
Guidance 
Organisations HEFCE 
Monitoring 
Training Forum News 
SUBSECTIONS Case Studies Prevent in my 
region 
Legal 
responsibilities 
Vice-
Chancellors 
Government 
departments  
- -  - 
 Understanding 
the issues 
What Prevent 
Means to HEIs 
Management of 
information 
Legal 
Practitioners 
Other 
organisations 
    
  Channel Inter-Faith 
relations 
University 
Chairs 
     
  Risk Factors External 
speakers 
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The General Guidance Section 
 
The General Guidance section provides details about some of the important information that 
education managers need to comply with in the Prevent Strategy Programme. These pieces of 
information are under 4 out of the 5 subsections of this section. They are Legal 
Responsibilities, Management of Information, Inter-Faith Relations and Management of 
Speakers. 
 
External authorities like the police also have materials on how HEIs can comply with Prevent 
Duty. The fifth subsection contains information on Regional Coordinators (Safe Campus 
Communities Programme n.d). 
 
The Role-Specific Guidance Section 
 
The Role-Specific Guidance section explains how specified HEI managers can carry out their 
Prevent duties and responsibilities effectively, and how they can partner with relevant 
Prevent authorities, for instance, the police, on how to achieve these tasks. Guidance 
materials are also available for use in this section.  
 
The subsections in this section consist of the 6 HEI managers: Vice-Chancellors, Legal 
Practitioners, University Chairs, Chief Security Officers, Chaplains and the Student Support 
Services (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d). 
 
The Organisations Section 
 
On this section, organisations that are ready and willing to offer assistance to HEIs on the 
Prevent Strategy and student-related matters can be found. The two subsections in this 
section are, Government Departments and Other Organisations. Under Government 
Department, the Department for Education and the Home Office offers assistance to HEIs 
while under Other Organisations, Higher Education Funding Council for England, the National 
Police Chief’s Council, Association of University Chief Security officers, National Union of 
Students, Association of Managers of Student Services in Higher Education, and Committee of 
University Chairs offers assistance and support to HEIs (Safe Campus Communities Programme 
n.d). 
 
The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) Monitoring Section 
 
The HEFCE Monitoring section provides information about the duties of the HEFCE which is the 
monitoring Council for HEIs in England. It provides details on the institutions of learning that 
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HEFCE covers and the framework with which they work with. A map of Prevent Coordinators 
within England along with their names, phone numbers and e-mails are provided on a link 
which redirects to the HEFCE website. Materials like advice notes and links to Higher 
Education Funding Council for Wales (EFCW) and that of the monitoring body for Scotland – 
local and national Prevent and CONTEST groups can also be found in the section (Safe Campus 
Communities Programme n.d). 
 
The Training Section 
 
The Training Section is exclusively available to log-in higher education staff members (but can 
also be accessed, although unauthorised to interested students and visitors to the site). When 
logged-in, access is given to the materials meant for higher education staff of Relevant Higher 
Education Bodies (RHEB) to study the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education (LFHE) 
course. The materials help members to implement their Prevent strategy duty for the HEIs. 
The course materials available in this section consist of 7 modules: An introduction to Prevent 
Duty as it affects higher education, The Leadership Challenge, The Prevent Duty (legislation 
and legal duties), Implementing the Prevent Duty and upholding academic freedom and 
freedom of speech, Student and Staff wellbeing issue?, Risk Assessment and Action Planning, 
and the ICT challenge. These materials, as presented in the section, have been reviewed and 
approved by relevant bodies within government and the education sector. Apart from the 
materials in the section, surveys can also be taken to give feedbacks on the Prevent materials 
available in the section (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d). 
 
The Forum Section 
 
The Forum section has Order and Category options where log-in users can choose from newer 
or older questions, events or topics that suit their interest. Log-in users can also post 
questions, reply posts and pass information to users in the section (Safe Campus Communities 
Programme n.d). 
 
The News Section 
 
The News section offers information on the developments in the HEIs with regards to the 
Prevent strategy (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d).  
 
Basically, most resources on the website focus on HEI managers’ guidelines on how to carry 
out their statutory duties regarding the Prevent Strategy. There are several case studies and 
resources on the website that students who are vulnerable to violent radicalisation and in 
need of urgent assistance may not find helpful. Impressively, there are available links that 
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redirect users to websites like the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and 
Political Violence (ICSR) and Radicalisation Research, however, there are no notable step-by-
step actions that students can take to prevent/halt their radicalisation process or understand 
whether the signs they are seeing from a potential recruiter/radicaliser are indeed real signs. 
There may, however, be dedicated centres on campuses where students can go to seek help 
and guidance as there is provision for such on the Student Support Services subsection of the 
Role-Specific Guidance menu. This may not be beneficial to students who are afraid or shy of 
reaching out to these centres for help. 
 
On the whole, the design of the SCCP’s website and the availability of open materials 
including the ease and unrestricted access to its login domain suggests that the website is 
designed not just for the HEI staff or students alone but also for members of the public who 
wish to understand one or two things about radicalisation can have access to such 
information. In addition to this, the contents of the website and the log-in domain are not 
secured (encrypted), perhaps because there seem not to be sensitive information on the 
website that may attract serious threats from attackers.  
 
By and large, the cumbersomeness of the SCCP’s website remains obvious when compared 
with the website of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political 
Violence (ICSR). The ICSR website has specifically 5 menus with no submenus. These are, 
About Us, Publications, Our Work, News and Contact Us. Each of the menus redirects 
undeviatingly to what they display. The publications on the ‘Publication’ menu are arranged 
from the latest to the oldest published topics, and there are signs that redirects visitors to 
the different ICSR social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) and also the 
website’s emails.  
 
In contrast, there is no display of social media links on the SCCP’s website. Also, the website 
may be difficult to understand for first-time visitors who intend to read about the factors that 
lead to violent radicalisation or how to prevent violent extremism from the website. In terms 
of security, both the SCCP and ICSR websites are insecure.  
 
Assessment of the SCCP’s website 
 
The SCCP’s website assessment was done based on accessibility, material contents, security, 
and its structure and usability 
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Accessibility 
 
It was observed that the SCCP website can be accessed both on laptops and mobile phones 
with all its features, however, on mobile phones, signs are used to indicate log-in areas and 
menu bars. On the search engine, Bing, the website’s credibility remain unconfirmed while it 
appears without question mark on Google. A sitemap is available for visitors to familiarise 
themselves with the website but there are missing links on some of the sections available. For 
example, the Contact link on the sitemap displays no e-mail address, phone number or 
contact address which makes it impossible to give feedbacks, inquire about a topic or get 
information about the SCCP office(s).  
 
Furthermore, it is unclear if the SCCP website was originally designed for HEI managers, 
students and/or visitors. What is, however, obvious is that most of the contents of the 
website target HEI managers with little available valuable information for students and 
visitors who intend to read about violent radicalisation and the factors that lead to it. 
 
SCCP Website Material Contents 
 
On the ‘Discover Useful Resources’ link on the homepage, available materials are not up to 
date. For example, the latest link on the homepage dates back to 2015 while some resources 
date as far back as 2010. However, on ‘Organisations’ menu, links to different case studies 
available on the section are as up to date as December 2016. Some of the materials on the 
Organisations menu are from reputable organisations and institutes that their materials can 
be relied upon.  
 
Examples of some of the publishers are, the Community Security Trust (CST), the Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue and Prevent Strategy and the International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) publications. It was also observed that the 
materials on the Discover Useful Resources section display randomly. This means that when 
the page is refreshed, the previously displayed materials changes. 
 
The font used on the website and its size are considerably legible for reading. The SCCP 
website uses size 11 of Omnes-pro font for its writings. 
 
Security 
 
It was observed that the SCCP website is not a secured (encrypted) website. Visitors to the 
site can obtain passwords and log-in information that allows them access to contents that are 
otherwise not accessible to visitors to the website.  
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Structure and Usability 
 
Structurally, the SCCP website looks defective. The Menus are a bit clumsy and complicated 
for visitors to navigate. Menu sections and subsections information do not really correlate. 
For example, when users click on the ‘Organisations’ section, the website redirects to 
‘Discover Useful Resources’ page which is in direct contrast with the term ‘organisations’. 
Also, to get information about organisations that support the SCCP, users need to leave the 
cursor on the Organisation menu before it displays the two submenus: ‘government 
departments’ and ‘other organisations’. This is a bit confusing. 
 
In addition, five of the eight menu sections have different subsections that can otherwise be 
merged under few section names to ease the burden of spending so much time to search and 
find information that users are interested in. Furthermore, as observed, the availability of the 
‘search link’ seem not to help users in easily and timely finding relevant information. 
 
In comparison to other similar websites, for example, the website of the International Centre 
for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), it is clear that the SCCP website 
is at best unorganised and user-unfriendly. With 5 menu sections, the ICSR website can easily 
and timely serve the purpose it was created to fulfil. On the other hand, the SCCP with 8-9 
sections (depending on either you are a visitor or a log-in user) and 20 subsections perform its 
functions in a complicated and inefficient manner. In summary, the website is difficult to 
navigate and search for relevant information. 
 
Apart from the SCCP website’s complexity, the loading speed was also tested using Google 
Page Speed Insights. The result of the site’s speed test shows that the loading speed of the 
website is 53/100 when it is accessed from a desktop computer while the speed reduces to 
43/100 when it is accessed through mobile phones. Interestingly, the loading speed of the 
SCCP website is faster than that of the ICSR website which loads at a speed of 39/100 on both 
mobile phones and desktop computers. However, variations in network provider’s download 
speed perhaps affect the loading speed of both the SCCP and ICSR websites when tested. 
The SCCP website was launched on both Google Chrome and Internet Explorer browsers 
without any impediment. It was noted that Universities UK operates the SCCP website while 
its management is carried out by Webstars. 
 
On the whole, there are adjustments that need to be made to make the SCCP website more 
accessibly effective and informative. 
 
 38 
5.2 The Student’s Survey 
 
The students’ survey was conducted to understand students’ opinion on adopting a counter-
radicalisation programme for HEIs in Finland similar to that of the UK. It also reflects 
students’ perception of general safety and security in HEIs in Finland and their opinion on the 
potential for Finnish HEIs to serve as recruitment centres for extremists and violent radicals.  
 
In all, 11 respondents answered the online questionnaire while 35 respondents answered the 
hardcopy questionnaire bringing the total number of respondents to 46. 
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The below table shows the result from 46 respondents (students) of the questionnaire. 
 
QUESTIONS ANSWERS NO OF 
RESPONDENTS 
Gender Males  
Females 
Other 
35 
11 
- 
Age 18-24 
25-30 
31-35 
21 
16 
9 
Affiliation Students 46 
Do you think teachers should be responsible for observing 
students in Finland for signs of violent extremism? 
Yes 
No 
Maybe 
17 
12 
17 
Do you think Finnish HEIs can serve as recruitment places 
for extremists? 
Yes 
No 
Maybe 
14 
15 
16 
Would you approve an enactment of a national law in 
Finland that mandates all HEI managers to set-up 
programmes to prevent violent extremism in their 
institutions? 
Yes 
No 
Maybe 
28 
10 
8 
Should HEIs in Finland have programmes in place to 
specifically prevent violent extremism? 
Yes 
No 
Maybe 
29 
7 
10 
Would you as a student approve programmes aimed at 
preventing violent extremism in your HEI of learning? 
Yes 
No 
Maybe 
34 
3 
9 
Should HEIs have offices for students in need of assistance 
from violent extremism-related issues 
Yes 
No 
Maybe 
32 
5 
9 
Have you at any time observed signs of extremism in a 
fellow student? 
Yes 
No 
Not Sure 
6 
37 
3 
Do you at all times feel safe and confident that Finnish 
institutions cannot be targets for attacks? 
Yes 
No 
Not Sure 
23 
14 
9 
Table 4: Student Survey Result Table 
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As can be seen in the table above, respondents opinion are evenly divided on whether 
teachers should be responsible for monitoring their students for signs of violent extremism in 
Finland or not. This suggests the topic remain a controversial issue among students. Aside 
from the responsibility issue, a considerable number of respondents (14 out of 46) believe 
that HEIs in Finland can serve as recruitment grounds for radicals, a slightly higher numbers 
(15 out of 46) believe Finnish HEIs do not serve as recruitment grounds. However, the 
majority of the respondents (16 out of 46) are unsure whether Finnish HEIs can serve as 
recruitment grounds for radicals or not.  
 
While most respondents (28 out of 46) are in support of a national law that makes it the duty 
of school administrators to have counter-radicalisation programmes in their schools, others 
(10 out of 46) do not support such idea while a lower number of respondents (8 out of 46) 
remain indecisive.  
 
Another important survey result comes from whether respondents have seen signs of 
extremism in other students. Most respondents (37 out of 46) believe they have never seen 
signs that may suggest extremism in other students, however, a notable (6 out of 46) number 
of respondents believe they have seen such signs in fellow students. Interestingly, a 
significant number of respondents (14 out of 46) are of the opinion that the Finnish HEIs are 
not ‘attack-proof’ and can be targeted for attacks by violent radicals or extremists while half 
of the respondents (23) are of the opinion that Finnish HEIs are safe at all times. 
 
Generally, the results from the survey questions reveal substantially (considering the number 
of respondents), the opinions and feelings of students with regard to violent radicalisation in 
HEIs and the role the law and teachers/lecturers can play in its prevention.  
However, the reliability of the survey cannot be assured due to the fact that respondents 
cannot be guaranteed to be genuine students albeit they were approached within the 
premises of a University of Applied Sciences.  
 
Secondly, there is no guarantee that respondents expressed their true opinions on the 
questions, neither are there any assurance that they indeed understood the questions 
correctly. Thirdly, the opinions of 46 respondents who were mainly approached in a Finnish 
University of Applied sciences, cannot be said to be valid enough to make a definitive 
conclusion due to the questionnaire’s limited demographic reach. 
 
These sentiments, as expressed by students is also of particular concern to the Finnish 
government. In recent time, the Finnish government has taken some measures aimed at 
combating radicalisation and violent extremism in Finland, particularly in Finnish schools as 
will be discussed below.  
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6 The Finnish Perspective 
 
The Finnish Ministry of the Interior defines violent extremism as the encouragement, 
justification, threat or the use of violence based on either an individual’s way of viewing the 
world or on his/her ideological views. The Finnish government believes ‘specific measures’ 
must be taken and implemented in order for the programmes to prevent violent radicalisation 
to be successful (Ministry of the Interior 2016, 5). 
 
Such measures, according to the Ministry of the Interior, involve proper coordination of 
prevention programmes, rightful dissemination of best practices standards, launching of 
RADINET - an exit programme for violent radicals, launching of helpline services for the 
relatives and friends of radicalised individuals, promotion of the works of organisations in the 
prevention of violent radicalisation, increasing competencies, awareness and skills in the 
prevention of violent radicalisation, detection and investigation of hate crimes and supporting 
the victims, prevention of violent radicalisation among asylum seekers, balancing 
communications for the prevention of violent radicalisation, training the youths to identify 
and disregard propaganda and violent-supporting messages, specifying police responsibilities 
and developing techniques for the prevention of all forms of violent radicalisation and 
extremism (Ministry of the Interior 2016, 19-28) 
 
As a global phenomenon, the Finnish government recognises that the threat from terrorism is 
not limited to a particular country or region, it affects all countries around the world 
including Finland.  
 
In 2014, Suojelupoliisi (Supo), the Finnish Security Intelligence Service claimed that Islamic 
extremists pose one of the most significant threats to Finland and that such threats mainly 
come from individuals who are sympathetic to Islamist organisations in Syria and Iraq. In the 
same year, it was reported that six Somali women travelled to Syria from Sweden, a 
neighbouring country, with the aim of joining the rebels in ousting the Syrian President 
(Helsinki Times 2014).  
 
These revelations and events show that the threats from extremism within the Nordic region 
may largely be due to individuals who become violently radicalised as a result of travelling to 
countries where Islamists are waging war against the governments.  
 
In recent history, there have been three public fatal attacks in Finland. In November 2007, an 
18-year-old man, Pekka-Eric Auvinen shot and killed 8 persons at a school in Jokela before 
killing himself. Ten months after the incident, a 22-year-old Hospitality Management student 
of Seinajoki University of Applied Sciences, Matti Juhani Saari, shot dead 10 students before 
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shooting himself dead. In December of 2009, Ibrahim Shkupolli, shot dead five persons 
including his girlfriend before shooting himself dead (Gabbatt 2009; Murderpedia n.d.) 
 
In another development, two individuals, a male and a female were in June 2014 jailed by 
the District Court of Helsinki for planning to commit mass killings at the University of 
Helsinki. Although the motive behind their plan was unknown, it was revealed that the 
culprits were inspired by the Boston Marathon bombings of 2013 (Salomaa & Teivainen 2014). 
 
In spite of the fact that the reasons behind these shootings may not be fully understood, they 
cannot be categorically referred to as terrorist acts. They, however, raise concerns about 
public safety in Finland and in Finnish schools. 
 
The Soufan Group (TSG) in 2015 (8) released a report which shows that 70 individuals have 
left Finland to join ISIS as at August 2015. Out of this figure, it was reported that more than 
25 have returned to Finland.  
 
Supo, Finland’s intelligence service also revealed that 20 people returned to Finland within 
the same period during the previous year. The agency added that half of those recruited in 
Finland by ISIS have lived in Finland all their lives while two third of these recruits possess 
Finnish citizenship (Yle 2014). 
 
Country Official 
figures 
Last updated Unofficial 
estimate 
TSG 2014 
report 
Returnees 
Finland 70 August 2015 70-100 30 25+ 
Sweden 300 October 2015 300 30 115 
Table 5: The Soufan Group (TSG) Foreign Fighters 2015 Report. 
 
The effects of the Syrian conflict, fatal shooting incidents and the issue of foreign fighters 
returning to Finland, coupled with the influx of refugees into Europe (which may have helped 
extremists to travel undetected) may have contributed to the development of a National 
Action Plan to prevent violent extremism and its attendant consequences in Finland. 
 
6.1 Legislations against Terror-Related Offences in Finland 
 
The Criminal Code of Finland captures offences that are related to or regarded as terrorism 
offences. According to the Act, an individual is regarded as having a ‘terrorist intent’ if 
he/she has the intention of creating fear among the Finnish people by unlawfully forcing or 
destabilising any arm of the government, the constitution or finance institutions of Finland 
(Ministry of Justice, Finland n.d.). 
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Chapter 34(a), section 1-8 of the Code (17/2003) details offences and sentences specifically 
regarded as terrorist acts in the Act. Some of such offences include, recruiting for terrorist 
purposes, making unlawful threats, intentionally possessing explosives, aggravated assault, 
murder, mass killings, homicide, coordinating a terrorist group, financing or giving legal 
advice to a terrorist group, providing training to terrorists, being in possession of explosives 
and explosive materials, among other similar acts stated in the Act (Ministry of Justice, 
Finland n.d.). 
 
Apart from the Criminal Code Act, the Police Act (872/2011) and the Coercive Measures Act 
(806/2011) also gives security agencies additional powers to effectively carry out their duties. 
The Police Act (872/2011), for example, in Chapter 2, Section 6, permits the police to access 
public and private properties. It also gives the police the power to search (section 12, 13 
supports searching) people in critical situations. Chapter 5 of the Act gives the police the 
right to use clandestine means to gather information on serious offences including terrorism 
and related offences specified in Chapter 34A of the Criminal Code Act (Ministry of the 
Interior, Finland n.d.). 
 
To aid security agencies work, Chapter 2 of the Coercive Measures Act (806/2011) gives the 
police the right to apprehend and remand terrorism suspects while Chapter 6 of the Act 
allows the police to ban terrorist suspects from travelling. Additionally, Chapter 6 of the 
Coercive Measures Act permits the police to seize materials or properties for security reasons 
including that of terrorism. Other powers (Chapter 9) include the right to use compelling 
means to retrieve information from suspects and covertly persuading suspects for reasons of 
special investigation purposes and terrorism-related offences to divulge needed information 
(Chapter 10) (Ministry of Justice, Finland n.d.). 
 
6.2 The National Action Plan 
 
The Finnish National Action Plan for preventing violent radicalisation and extremism was 
concluded in 2012 but updated and approved in April 2016. The plan was created to render 
assistance to the Ministry of the Interior of Finland in the coordination of the prevention 
programmes for radicalisation at the national level.  
The objective of the Action Plan is to guarantee the existence of a permanent structure and 
capability for the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation throughout Finland 
(Ministry of the Interior n.d.).  
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The Finnish government believes that the problems related to social issues, such as poor 
upbringing, lack of social well-being and cohesion, discrimination, integration issues, lack of 
education or poor education can all contribute to the development of extremism or violent 
radicalisation in Finland (Ministry of the Interior 2016, 13).  
 
There are different actors that the Action Plan rely upon to achieve all of its objectives in the 
different sectors stated in the Plan. They are policy makers, social workers, the police, 
education stakeholders, healthcare practitioners, youth workers, social service workers, 
religious leaders, non-governmental organisations and the local communities (Ministry of the 
Interior n.d.). 
 
The Action Plan emphasises the importance of the education sector in the prevention of 
violent radicalisation and extremism. The Plan recommends that teachers should monitor 
their student’s wellbeing and social participation at different levels of study in order to 
improve general security and safety around schools. As professionals in the education sector, 
teachers are expected to improve student’s skills and ability to process public information 
with open minds and also assist them on how to engage and participate in decision-making 
activities without the use of violence (Ministry of the Interior 2016, 17).  
 
6.3 Training of Teachers 
 
As pointed out in the National Action Plan, teachers are expected to always observe and 
correctly guide their students away from violent extremism. In achieving this, the Finnish 
government has concluded plans to use the police in the training of education sector 
professionals in order to assist them in identifying students that are vulnerable to 
radicalisation or those that show signs of violent radicalisation and extremism through proper 
observation (Yle 2016).  
 
The training programme which is expected to be voluntary is scheduled to begin in 2017, 
however, a pilot project has already been conducted in some parts of Finland. It is expected 
that only senior school officials will be enrolled for the programme. These trained senior 
officials will later be tasked with the training of other members of their institutions (Yle 
2016).  
 
From the series of measures taken by the Finnish government, it is clear that the government 
has recognised the threats and problems posed by extremism and violent radicalisation in 
Europe and the Nordic region and has taken series of measures to prevent their spread within 
Finnish societies. It, however, remains to be seen how these measures will be perceived by 
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different groups, particular the minority groups, and how these measures impact in the fight 
against violent radicalisation. 
 
 
7 Challenges 
 
Radicalisation and Counter-radicalisation studies are an emerging field of study. They are 
broad, diverse and can have inconclusive and controversial research results. Also, there are 
limited scholarly books and articles that directly and comprehensively discuss counter-
radicalisation. Many of the research works focus on case studies from countries that have 
initiated one form of counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation programmes or another. 
This makes it difficult to get a general perspective on counter-radicalisation studies and 
policies from research scholars. 
 
There are also challenges of getting the English versions of the Finnish Laws. Where available, 
the English translated copies of the laws are only admissible in the Finnish language. By 
implication, it means that the English translations of these documents that are referenced in 
this write-up may not necessarily provide the accurate translations to the quoted Acts. 
 
Another challenge faced was getting approval for the survey questionnaire on time due to 
administrative and safety-related issues. The thesis report was delayed for some time while 
awaiting approval or the survey questions from the Research and Development Services 
office. 
 
Also of a challenge is getting students to fill questionnaires particularly the online 
questionnaires. Some students procrastinate and end up not filling it at all. Hard copies of the 
questionnaires proved a better alternative in this regard due to the fact that they are easy to 
distribute and easier to retrieve after filling. However, analysing the results of the hardcopy 
questionnaires proved more challenging and time-consuming.  
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8 Conclusions 
 
The definitions of violent radicalisation and extremism by different governments have 
noticeable keywords that may have largely been influenced by their way of life and/or local 
politics. For example, the UK government is of the opinion that radicalisation has to do with 
activities that are against British ‘fundamental values’ and regards extremism as 
‘unacceptable behaviours’ while the Australian Government thinks ‘unconventional beliefs’ 
cannot be regarded as radicalisation as long as they do not promote violence. The former 
definition is equivocal while the latter is more explicit in terms of interpretation. 
 
In addition, some country’s counter-radicalisation programmes focus attention on preventing 
violent radicalisation by profiling specific set of individuals or communities while many 
scholars and researchers focus on understanding the state of minds of radical individual’s and 
the impact their immediate environment plays in their radicalisation process. Scholars are 
more holistic in their approach to counter-radicalisation while it seems governments prefer 
shorter but ineffective routes to counter-radicalisation. 
 
Also, from the research works analysed and from the different scholarly books and articles 
read, it is clear that there are no definitive paths that lead to violent radicalisation. Thus, it 
is hard to create specific profiles or counter-radicalisation programmes for violent radicals, 
extremists or terrorists. Even among scholars, there is no consensus on the process that leads 
to violent extremism. However, one thing that is clear and agreed upon by many of the 
scholars is that radicalisation, violent radicalisation or extremism is a ‘process’ that needs an 
ideology or a certain belief to thrive. It was understood that violent ideologies or beliefs are 
mostly fuelled by grievances of different nature and in order to counter these ideologies and 
beliefs, the process that leads to them must first be studied and understood. 
 
Apart from grievances against the state, it was noted that thoughts of changing the 
governance system a country, perhaps as a result of perceived corruption or bad governance 
can also lead to violent radicalisation and terrorism. 
 
Presently, the issue of violent radicals’ state of mind remains inconclusive. While some 
researchers believe depression and mental instability may contribute to violent extremism, 
others have argued that majority of extremists are rational. I believe that mental instability 
is one factor in the radicalisation process, however, it seems that this factor contributes 
insignificantly to many of the cases of violent extremists studied over the years by 
researchers.  
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Of importance is the fact that what some potential extremists perceive to be grievances 
against their community or country may be wished away by others, and what lead some 
individuals to violent radicalisation do not necessarily lead others to it. This, I consider an 
area of interest for future research.  
 
The SCCP under the Prevent Strategy has made significant progress in the prevention of 
violent radicalisation in HEIs in the UK. This is in spite of its criticisms by concerned 
professionals in the education sector. These concerns should be looked into to further 
strengthen the effectiveness of the programme and restore confidence in its acceptability by 
all concerned stakeholders.  
 
In Finland, the Finnish government appears to understand the threats posed by violent 
radicalisation in the society and has initiated a national programme to prevent the factors 
that lead to it in all aspects of its residents’ daily life, including the education sector.  
This is to be achieved through the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent 
Radicalisation and Extremism in Finland.  
 
Apart from the fact that the result of the student survey conducted shows that majority of 
the respondents (60.9%) support an enactment of a national law in Finland that is similar to 
that of the UK’s Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 that encompasses the Prevent 
Strategy which empowers HEI managers to prevent violent radicalisation in their institutions, 
a significant number of respondents (30.4%) are also of the opinion that the Finnish HEIs are 
not ‘attack-proof’ and can be targeted for attacks by violent radicals or extremists. 
 
Interestingly, unlike in the UK where university professors, managers and student groups are 
against the Prevent Strategy programme in HEIs for fear of the programme’s subversion of the 
freedom of speech that students enjoy, teachers/lecturers in Finland have so far not objected 
to the training programme being organised by the government to train them. Perhaps, this is 
due to their different approaches. 
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9 General Observations and Recommendations 
 
Firstly, government definitions that are related to violent radicalisation, extremism and/or 
terrorism should be defined objectively and unambiguously, and in a language that a layman 
can understand. Also, such definitions should be devoid of appeals to political interests or 
narratives. This is to allow for anti- and counter-radicalisation programmes to be carried out 
effectively without political, religious or cultural influences, and also to give credibility to 
such programmes. 
 
From the different researches that were read and analysed, one point was clear, violent 
radicalisation or extremism is a process that differs from individual to individual. For this 
reason, any strategy, programme, plan or approach designed to prevent violent radicalisation 
should be tailored towards understanding the factors and root causes of violent radicalisation 
in individuals. For example, this can be achieved by interviewing de-radicalised individuals to 
get an insight into why they transformed from using non-violent approaches to using violence 
as a means of agitation.  
 
From my understanding of the several research works on counter-radicalisation, introducing a 
general strategy to counter radicalisation may at best be controversial and ineffective, and at 
worst, counter-productive. 
 
Training of the actors (those responsible for detecting and preventing violent radicalisation in 
students of HEIs) with the required skills and knowledge is also essential. This is because, to 
be successful with counter-radicalisation programmes, individuals tasked with preventing 
violent radicalisation must have the needed qualifications, experience, right attitude towards 
work, good motivation and commitment that can allow them to carry out their tasks as 
expected so that they can be able to instil confidence in their students and assure them that 
the true intentions (objectives) of the programme are not to spy or gather intelligence but to 
prevent violent radicalisation in HEI environments and to ensure that campuses are safe not 
just for the students, but also teaching and non-teaching staff, visitors and study purposes. 
 
To ensure that professional training is constantly given to these actors, the government must 
address the issue of lack of funding for universities and colleges staff in order not to disrupt 
or discontinue training programmes that are meant to empower HEI authorities. 
 
The Muslim communities in the UK should also through their various associations be assured 
by the government that the Prevent Strategy was not set-up to ‘snoop’ on their private life 
but to ensure the prevention of violent radicalisation in the whole of the UK without 
specifically targeting a particular group for intelligence gathering, persecution or unjust 
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prosecution. This initiative can be achieved by involving influential Islamic organisations like 
the neglected Islamic Society of Britain, Muslim Association of Britain and, the Muslim Council 
of Britain in the Prevention Strategy programme. Influential Muslim clerics and leaders should 
also be involved. These leaders can be encouraged to preach and propagate the benefits of 
the Prevent Strategy to their followers and also allay fears that the government is specifically 
targeting Muslim communities for spying purposes but that the programme’s aim is to prevent 
violent radicalisation in the whole of UK.  
 
Such awareness programme can also be adopted in university campuses in the UK. Leaders of 
different organisations, particularly Muslim student’s organisations should be actively 
involved in the Prevent Strategy. This is to assure some of these organisations that the SCCP, 
an arm of the Prevent Strategy is not directed towards witch-hunting, intimidating or 
discriminating against Muslim students but to ensure university environments are safe for 
learning and devoid of recruitments by violent radicals.  
 
In addition to these, good communications and interrelationships among different authorities 
tasked with various responsibilities under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act must be 
developed and encouraged in order to ensure that the Prevent Duties stipulated in the Act are 
effectively delivered. Furthermore, universities, colleges and local authorities like the police 
should be encouraged to work together to prevent violent radicalisation in universities, 
colleges and the general society.  
 
It also appears that the UK government failed to carry HEI managers along before proposing 
the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to the parliament. This, perhaps, led over 500 
professors from different UK universities to protest against the Act in The Guardian 
Newspaper. The government needs to create awareness programmes that can be used to 
educate HEI managers on the aims, objectives and benefits of the Prevent Strategy 
programme. The government should also state clearly the responsibilities of HEI managers in 
achieving the Prevent Strategy goals. This is in addition to guaranteeing that the Act was not 
formulated to water down the freedom of speech of students, the openness or the free-
thinking nature HEIs enjoy. The government should also assure HEIs managers that the law 
does not discourage debates of controversial issues that are not regarded as demeaning or 
inciting violence towards minority groups as expressed in the Act.  
 
Relatively, distinctions should be made between students’ freedom of speech and speeches 
that incite discrimination or violence. 
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The Safe Campus Communities Programme (SCCP) Website 
 
The structure of the SCCP website needs to be redesigned, reorganised and updated to make 
its navigation and use more effective and informative. There are excessive menu sections and 
subsections that can mislead and waste the time of the website visitors. Some of these 
sections and subsections can be merged to reduce surfing time and increase delivery and 
effectiveness of the SCCP website. For example, the Resources menu can contain all relevant 
and up-to-date materials about researches and findings associated with violent radicalisation 
and Safe Campus Communities Programme (SCCP) without repeating such in other menus.  
 
Additionally, easily understood and straightforward names should also be given to the main 
menu lists. Also, the maximum number of menu sections on the SCCP website should not be 
allowed to exceed five to reduce the unnecessarily wasted time on the website.  
 
Apart from this, the search link should be made to be robust enough to suggest similar topics 
that could not be found on the website. In addition, the loading speed of the SCCP should be 
increased on both desktop computers and mobile phones. Loading speed of 53/100 on desktop 
and 43/100 on mobile phones cannot be said to be impressive or satisfactory. 
 
The Contact link on the SCCP should be updated to include contact details like the phone 
numbers, e-mails or contact addresses of the officials or managers of the programme that can 
be contacted for inquiries, complaints or feedbacks about the website or the SCCP. 
 
Aside from the Contact link, the Resources section on the website also need to be updated to 
include valuable and relevant information for students and visitors about violent 
radicalisation, the factors that lead to it and the different ways to prevent it. Presently, most 
of the materials on the website focuses on information that largely serves as a guide to HEI 
managers. 
 
Security of the SCCP website should be prioritised and improved. The ability of visitors to 
obtain passwords and log-in details despite warnings and supposed restrictions on the website 
is unbelievable and poses information exposure risks to the personal details of HEI managers 
in UK universities and colleges. 
 
In general, the SCCP website should be periodically assessed to allow for its conformity to the 
deliverables it was created to serve, and updates should always be provided to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the website.  
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Improving the effectiveness of the counter-radicalisation programmes in Finnish HEIs. 
 
Impressively, there have been series of measures that the Finnish government has taken in 
order to prevent violent radicalisation in Finnish societies, and in particular Finnish schools. 
However, in order not to encounter the pitfalls associated with the UK Counter-Terrorism Act 
of 2015 which encompasses the Prevent Strategy under which the SCCP falls, the Finnish 
government must, apart from making laws (Criminal Code, Police Act and Coercive Measures 
Act of Finland) to prevent and dissuade terrorism, should create awareness about the benefits 
of the National Action Plan on the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism to all 
Finnish residents irrespective of religion, race, culture or political affiliations.  
 
Instilling confidence in the public about the apolitical, unbiased and indiscriminate nature of 
the programme will serve as a solid foundation for the success of the National Action Plan. In 
addition to the actors captured in the Plan, human rights organisations, HEI managers and 
student union leaders should also be actively involved in the Plan to make it acceptable and 
far reaching to different groups. 
 
Although there have been no established concrete reasons why assailants have attacked HEIs 
in Finland in the past, there is the need for improved safety awareness programmes for 
students in HEIs in Finland. Orientations about general safety rules and actions that can be 
taken in case of emergencies should be given to new and old students at regular intervals so 
that students can develop proper natural responses to unfortunate and unforeseen situations. 
Furthermore, there should be information system mechanisms in place to monitor and deny 
students the access to online materials that teaches, promotes or propagates the incitement 
of violence or terrorism. HEI study rooms should also be allocated based on a booking process 
that identifies the booking student, duration of use and the purpose for booking. 
 
Training of religious leaders and teachers at all levels of education should be regarded as the 
most important mandate of the National Action Plan. Teachers, aside from parents are the 
first contacts that children have, thus, there is the need to recruit qualified teachers and 
equip them with the relevant trainings and skills to be able to identify real signs of [violent] 
radicalisation in their pupils, be able to neutralise these ideologies and also be able to 
identify when such cases should be transferred to higher authorities, for example, the police 
if their interventions fail.  
 
In the National Action Plan, the police are expected to train teachers. I will suggest experts in 
the field of counter-radicalisation from HEIs and reputable organisations should be tasked 
with such responsibilities to avoid speculations of intelligence gathering or spying on minority 
and certain religious groups. To add to this, counter-radicalisation training for specific HEI 
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managers and practitioners should be made to be mandatory and not voluntary as revealed in 
the Plan. This is to inculcate the culture of awareness and prevention [of all forms of violent 
radicalisation] into Finnish HEI managers and staff. 
 
Finally, the aim of the National Action Plan is to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism 
and not to allow individuals to cross the line of peace to violent agitation. In achieving this, 
the social well-being of children should be given the required attention. Additionally, 
discrimination, persecution and illiteracy should be discouraged, particularly among minority 
groups.  
 
 
10 Future Research 
 
In the course of this research work, some certain questions come to mind and others were 
raised by researchers in the field of counter-radicalisation. Some of these questions are: 
 
1. Why do some radicalised individuals resort to violence while others do not?  
 
2. Some of the factors that lead to violent radicalisation and terrorism in some 
individuals also happen to a larger number of the population, why do few members 
resort to terrorism? 
 
3. Does racism or discrimination (of different sorts) lead or speed up the process that 
leads to violent radicalisation?  
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